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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
I have been invited to this conference to speak on the topic 
of “Democracy and Freedom of Religion in Indonesia: An 
Insight from an Outsider.”  As this is my first visit to 
Indonesia, I am very much an outsider and this paper is 
written in the spirit of gratitude and humility for the 
opportunity to discuss my research.  I am excited for the 
chance to learn more about the relationship between law 
and religion in Indonesia, and to take back with me some 
valuable insights that I can apply in the future. 
In my initial survey of the relationship between 
religion and the government in Indonesia, I was struck by 
the fact that there was an “official list” of religions in the 
country.  The number is often given as six (Islam, 
Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and 
Confucianism),
1
 but this number is subject to contraction
2
 
and expansion
3
 as the government deems necessary.  
Official recognition brings substantial benefits to followers 
(such as in obtaining building permits for places of 
worship, marriage licenses, and cemetery allotments), 
while individuals affiliated with unregistered religions face 
severe burdens in life unless they publicly identify with 
one of the limited number of official religions.
4
  Indeed, 
some scholars argue that adherence to one of the state-
recognised religions is or was essentially an obligation of 
citizenship.
5
  However, I am far from an expert on the 
subject and unfamiliar with the day-to-day realities of 
adherents to unrecognised religions. 
Indonesia is only one of many countries in the 
world that require religions to register with, and receive 
approval from, the government.  For example, several 
Eastern bloc countries, including Hungary, Austria, and 
Russia, passed legislation since the fall of Communism to 
                                                          
1  See, e.g., Melissa Crouch, „Regulating Places of Worship in 
Indonesia: Upholding Freedom of Religion for Religious 
Minorities?‟ [2007] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 96, 99. 
2  For example, Confucianism was removed from the list at one point, 
but later re-recognised decades later.  See Yuksel Sezgin & Mirjam 
Kunkler, „Regulation of “Religion” and the “Religious”: The 
Politics of Judicialization and Bureaucratization in India and 
Indonesia” 56 Comparative Studies in Society and History 448, 465 
n.14 (2014). 
3  For example, Baha‟I has been added to the list according to one 
source.  See Amanah Nurish, „Welcoming Baha‟i: New official 
religion in Indonesia‟ The Jakarta Post (8 August 2014). 
4  See Sezgin & Kunkler, above n.2, at 463; Nurish, above n. 3. 
5  See Sezgin & Kunkler, above n. 2, at 463. 
require the registration of religious groups.
6
  Indeed, if a 
worldwide tally were completed, it would likely be an eye-
opening exercise for most people living in western liberal 
democracies.  My perspective, as an outsider to this 
conference, is of someone who has lived in the United 
States, Canada, and Australia; three countries where no 
one‟s religion is listed on government identification cards, 
conversion and apostasy are unregulated, religious groups 
need register with the government only for very specific 
purposes (like charitable tax exemptions), and the free-for-
all between majority/minority and established/new 
religious groups is seen as a desirable feature of the “free 
market in faith.” 
I would like to suggest that, from the perspective 
of freedom of religion and human rights, the official 
registration and recognition of religious groups is 
inevitably problematic in democratic societies.  Several 
arguments against the practice follow, but many share a 
common theme: scepticism of government power.  When 
bureaucrats and politicians gain authority over religion, 
they are likely to exercise their power in ways that are 
clumsy, narrow-minded, and for their own political 
purposes.  This inevitable misuse of power then distorts 
the independence of religious groups and the freedoms of 
individual religious believers.  
  
II. ARGUMENT 
A. DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION 
 
One obvious reason that the registration of religious 
groups is problematic is that “religion” is one of the most 
complex, mutable, and contested aspects of communal and 
individual identity that societies must grapple with.  
Despite an enormous literature on the subject, merely 
defining the term “religion” itself has vexed legal scholars7 
                                                          
6  See, e.g., Asim Jusic, „Constitutional Changes and the Incremental 
Reductions of Collective Religious Freedom in Hungary‟ 10 Vienna 
Journal on International Constitutional Law 199 (2016); 
Christopher J. Miner, „Losing My Religion: Austria‟s New Religion 
Law in Light of International and European Standards of Religious 
Freedom‟ 1998 Brigham Young University Law Review 607; June 
M. Kelly, „Searching for Spiritual Security: The Tangled 
Relationship of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian State and 
Religious Freedom‟ (2018) 25 University of Miami International 
and Comparative Law Review 263. 
7  See, e.g., Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. 
Commonwealth, (1943) 67 C.L.R. 116, 123 (per Latham, CJ) (“It 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to devise a definition of 
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 and anthropologists alike.
8
  The crux of the problem is that 
neutral, principled reasons for defining some belief 
systems as “religious” and others as “secular” have never 
been articulated in a wholly satisfactory manner.  Our 
views on what count as “religious” involve an element of 
subjectivity, and subjectivity opens the doorway to 
unconscious bias and short-sighted results.  In some 
circumstances, such as a freedom of religion claim, courts 
and administrative tribunals may have no choice but to try 
to determine whether an individual‟s beliefs are 
“religious” in nature.  But the task is a fraught one that 
wise decision-makers avoid whenever possible and, when 
unavoidable, handle with the utmost delicacy. 
But if defining a belief system as a “religion” is 
difficult and dangerous, government intervention in 
circumscribing the boundaries of particular religions is 
even worse.  We can think of obvious historical examples 
such as the Inquisition and Reformation in Europe and the 
unfathomable bloodshed caused by attempts to decide 
whether Catholicism or Protestantism were the one true 
expression of Christianity.  Modern examples abound as 
well, such as controversy in Russia about whether 
Jehovah‟s Witnesses are Christian, in India as to whether 
adherents to Vedanta should also be considered adherents 
to Hinduism, and here in Indonesia, about whether 
followers of the Ahmaddiyah movement are Muslim.  
These controversies and clashes—which sometimes result 
in suppression and violence—are not simply occasional 
unfortunate side effects of government involvement in the 
registration of religions.  These problems are the 
predictable and inevitable outcomes of the entire concept.  
The incurable problem of definition is part and parcel of 
registration systems, and the problem is exacerbated when 
countries try to limit the number of “official religions” to a 
small handful.
9
 
The deeper reason why official registration of 
religions is ultimately unsupportable is because both 
religion (as a concept) and religions (as groups of like-
minded believers) are constantly changing.  Traditional 
beliefs diverge, causing schism; old rivalries are set aside, 
leading to syncretism or unification; new beliefs emerge 
leading to what laypersons call “cults” (and sociologists of 
religion call “New Religious Movements”).  All of this is 
happening in real time, but often in subtle undercurrents 
within and between religious groups in ways that are very 
                                                                                               
religion which would satisfy the adherents of all the many and 
various religions which exist, or have existed, in the world.”); M. 
Elisabeth Bergeron, Note, ‘New Age’ or New Testament?: Toward a 
More Faithful Interpretation of ‘Religion’, 65 St. John‟s L. Rev. 
365, 366 (1991) (“The formulation of a workable definition 
particularly confronts the judiciary with an unyielding 
conundrum”). 
8  See, e.g., Morton Klass, Ordered Universes: Approaches to the 
Anthropology of Religion (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) 8 
(discussing enormous disagreement on what counts as “religion”). 
9  For example, Russia‟s 1997 religious affiliation law only allowed 
“traditional confessions” (the Russian Orthodox Church, Judaism, 
Buddhism, and Islam) to create religiously-affiliated schools, 
leading schools affiliated with other religious groups “subject to 
government restrictions and harassment.”  See Perry L. Glanzer & 
Konstanti Petrenko, „Religion and Education in Post-Communist 
Russia: Russia‟s Evolving Church-State Relations‟ (2007) 49 
Journal of Church & State 53, 67-68.. 
hard for outsiders to discern until something dramatic 
happens to make it visible.  Trying to contain and corral 
religious diversity through official registration is like 
trying to ride a bucking stallion—it may seem to be 
working at first, but eventually results in a painful fall.  In 
short, governments can do many things, but adroitly 
navigate the changing and ever-complex landscapes of 
religiosity in a globalised world is not one of them. 
 
B. DISTORTION AND EXCLUSION 
 
In theory, government registration of “official” religious 
groups could be mere symbolism, with no tangible benefits 
for the favoured or tangible hindrances for the disfavoured.  
But as discussed in the opening, most countries with 
registration systems attach very real consequences to the 
categorization.  Unregistered religions may or may not be 
“illegal” per se when it comes to assembling for worship, 
but they are likely to face numerous practical difficulties 
that registered religions do not.  Similarly, an individual‟s 
affiliation with a registered or unregistered religion may 
determine what rights or privileges are available.  By 
attaching tangible consequences to registration, 
governments invariably impact the choices that groups and 
individuals make when it comes to religion.
10
   
The effects of this distortion of religious choice 
and exclusion of some believers from benefits available to 
others is a violation of the principles of freedom of religion 
and equality.  It leads to a reality where some individuals 
have to pretend to be a member of a particular faith in 
order to be treated fairly, and may even have to publicly 
profess creeds that strike deeply against their real (but 
hidden) conscientious beliefs.  Likewise, a survey of 
countries with formal recognition schemes shows that it is 
generally wealthy, large, and long-established religious 
groups that receive government approval; in contrast, 
minority religious groups (especially new or controversial 
ones) are substantially disadvantaged.  Registration thus 
becomes a sort of protective straitjacket to maintain the 
status quo; an attempt that will eventually fail, but carries 
with it pain and hardship in the process. 
We should also not forget the distortion effects on 
those religious groups that are registered.  If religious 
groups can be de-registered (as history shows), then the 
state holds tremendous power over them.  Registered 
religious groups are less likely to express discontent with 
government policy, encourage members to vote for a 
change in government, or cooperate with disfavoured 
religious, social, or political minority groups.  To the 
degree that registration allows for government to co-opt 
the voice of religious groups, a true disservice is done to 
the vital role that faiths play as separate loci for moral 
authority and civic engagement. 
 
 
                                                          
10  An example given in the literature on Indonesia in particular is of a 
Confucian couple who were not allowed to marry in 1995 (during 
the period of time between the de-registration and re-registration of 
Confucianism) unless they registered with one of the recognised 
faiths.  See Sezgin & Kunkler, above n. 2, at 448-449. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
Proponents of registration articulate various rationales: 
some say it is a mere acknowledgement of formative and 
traditional faiths in a country,
11
 others as a way to contain 
“dangerous cults” and “extremists”.12  To the degree these 
proponents are sincere, they have overlooked the severe 
consequences of registration on the right to freedom of 
religion for groups and individuals.  Registration is not 
necessary—many democratic countries do just fine 
without it—and carries with it the problems of definition, 
evolution, distortion, and exclusion discussed above.  At 
its core, registration is about control: government control 
of religious believers.  It‟s a form of control prone to abuse 
for partisan and short-sighted political reasons, a form of 
control likely to lead to ethnic or sectarian conflict, and a 
form of control that undermines the independence of 
religious groups and the legitimate faith choices of 
individuals.  Constitutional democracies with entrenched 
guarantees of religious freedom should find registration 
schemes repugnant to this fundamental right. 
The position expressed in this paper is consistent 
with the classical liberal concern over the maintenance of 
religion and state in separate spheres.  However, as an 
outsider, it‟s also important for me to acknowledge the 
limitations of this worldview, and to be open to the felt 
needs of societies with unique histories and needs.  Thank 
you again for the opportunity to discuss these important 
issues, and I look forward to the opportunity to learn from 
the question and discussion that follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11  This is the rationale given in Russia.  See Glanzer & Petrenko, 
above n. 9, at 54. 
12  This is the rationale given in Austria.  See Miner, above n. 6, at 620. 
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